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  Chapter 17 
the State Courts and alaska politics: 
Independence, public accountability, 
and political Influence
Michael L. Boyer
The judiciary, or court system as it is often called in Alaska, is established in Article IV 
of the Alaska Constitution. It is part of the triad of strong and often contending branches 
of Alaska state government that is identified in Chapter 2 as one of the characteristics of 
Alaska politics. Yet, unlike the legislature and executive, much of the day-to-day work of 
the courts, including the Alaska Supreme Court, has nothing to do with politics. Courts 
spend the vast majority of their time resolving private disputes and enforcing criminal 
laws. 
Sometimes, however, the courts make judgments that have far-reaching political and 
policy effects, occasionally leading to major conflicts with the legislative and executive 
branches. Occasional political fallout from judicial decisions is not surprising because 
courts play an important role in regulating society, defining individual rights, mediating 
between competing public policy goals, and developing legal rules in areas in which the 
legislature has not acted. Moreover, decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court are binding 
legal precedent on matters of state law. Plus, the courts have the power of judicial review 
to pass judgment on the constitutionality of statutes and executive regulations, and on 
occasion have invalidated them. 
Most fundamental in shaping its inevitable involvement in politics is the fact that, 
although Alaska’s court system strives for independence and impartiality, it is subject to 
many of the political pressures explained throughout the book. Thus, in some court deci-
sions there is an unavoidable policy outcome. Add to this that the court system must vie for 
its budget with the two branches upon which it often passes judgment, that its judges must 
face the electorate periodically, and that the people of Alaska could ultimately restructure 
the judicial system through one or more constitutional amendments, then the complexity 
of the courts’ role in Alaska government and politics becomes even more obvious.
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We begin with an explanation of the chapter’s theme: How does the Alaska political 
and governmental process deal with the tension between the need for judicial indepen-
dence, public accountability, and the court system’s role in politics and public policy mak-
ing? The following two sections explore the influences that have shaped the Alaska court 
system and its organization. The next section explains the devices that work to promote 
independence and impartiality. Then we explore in more detail six aspects of the role of 
the courts in Alaska politics and policy making. 
1. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, AND THE COURT SYSTEM’S  
    POLITICAL ROLE: AN OVERVIEW
Together with freedom of association and expression, an independent judiciary is 
one of the hallmarks of a pluralist democracy. In this context “independent” means free-
dom from control, interference, or influence by the other two branches of government, 
political parties, interest groups, and any other forces, political or otherwise, in making 
decisions. The courts need this independence to pass judgment on a host of cases both 
civil and criminal, to protect the rights of citizens, to enforce the rules of government, 
and to curb the power of government if it goes beyond its constitutional and statutory 
authority. Independence is usually achieved by providing for a certain amount of security 
of tenure for judges. 
In theory, at least, independence is bestowed on a judiciary in a democracy so that it 
can act with impartiality in making judgments and interpreting the law and the constitu-
tion. However, laws and constitutional provisions are rarely, if ever, black and white, but 
are subject to various interpretations. It is interpretation that determines the outcome of 
many cases coming before the courts for a decision. This ambiguity in the law is the root 
of the policy-making role of the courts as well as the explanation for much of the political 
controversy that often surrounds the judiciary. 
Alaska’s approach to balancing judicial independence with judicial accountability to 
the public combines two elements: (1) a selection process that is based, theoretically at 
least, on merit and not the political perspective of the candidates; and (2) periodic recon-
firmation of judges by the electorate. This approach is a compromise between the federal 
system of lifetime tenure and the purely electoral system used in many states. Alaska’s 
system neither eliminates political fallout from court decisions nor completely insulates 
the courts from political pressures. But compared with many states, it does reduce the 
intensity of politics surrounding the judiciary. 
There are several ways in which the judiciary becomes involved in politics or affects 
public policy, but five are particularly important. The first two are by far the most signifi-
cant when it comes to political impact and likely political fallout. 
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First, the courts interpret the state constitution, interpret and pass judgment on the 
constitutionality of state laws enacted by the legislature, and interpret regulations adopted 
by executive departments. Courts are also called upon to decide whether executive offi-
cials have acted constitutionally or within the limits of state laws. Laws, regulations, and 
executive decisions frequently create or affect public policy, and sometimes the policies 
are major ones. As a result, judicial decisions concerning them may have significant pol-
icy implications. A few examples include cases affecting personal privacy, subsistence, 
Native sovereignty, prisoners’ rights, and eligibility for the Permanent Fund Dividend 
(PFD). Some of these decisions are the result of cases being brought by interest groups on 
various sides of an issue. Second, although it is a separate branch of government and not 
simply an agency (in contrast, for example, to the Department of Labor), the court system 
must still lobby the legislature for its annual operating budget and on other issues that 
directly affect the judicial system. For example, if the court system needs additional supe-
rior court judges in a particular area of the state, it must obtain authorizing legislation. 
Similarly, salary increases for judges require legislative action, though Article IV, Section 
13, of the constitution prohibits the legislature from reducing the salary of sitting judges. 
Thus, when the  judicial branch seeks legislative action, it is itself acting as an interest 
(a “lobby”), and the court system’s administrative director, or his or her representative, 
sometimes operates in the legislature as a political operative just like any other lobbyist. 
Third, while the retention elections that judges must face periodically are rarely 
controversial, occasionally they do become heated. For example, two chief justices, Jay 
Rabinowitz in 1988 and Dana Fabe in 2010, received some fairly intense opposition to 
their reconfirmation, though both secured retention. This opposition shaved ten points or 
more off of the usual 65 or so percent that judges receive in reconfirmation votes. Fourth, 
and a related point, there are periodic moves to reform the court system, including the 
way that judges are selected and retained, and these efforts can also get quite political. 
The fifth aspect of the judiciary’s role that may have political implications is what can 
be called judicial administrative activism (related to but not to be confused with judicial 
activism, explained below). Administrative activism is where the court system, particu-
larly the chief justice and administrative director, takes action to make the court system 
more responsive to Alaska’s needs, particularly in rural-bush areas. 
the tension between Independence, Impartiality, and politics: the Issue of Judicial activism
When the theory of impartiality meets the reality of the need for courts to interpret 
the law, tensions inevitably arise. Most judicial interpretations of the law have few polit-
ical consequences, but others can cause quite a political stir. When courts take an active, 
often expansive role in interpreting laws and constitutional provisions that have major 
policy and political consequences, it is often referred to as judicial activism. This is a term 
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with many nuances of meaning and can be used in a positive or pejorative way depending 
on whether a particular judicial decision is viewed positively or negatively. 
In essence, judicial activism is the court taking the initiative in making decisions that 
might normally be seen as the province of legislation, or interpreting the constitution or 
a law very broadly. Judicial activism is often characterized by a broad construction of the 
constitution and laws, and can be contrasted with strict construction. Judicial activism 
is usually associated with courts with liberal leanings and a liberal philosophy in general. 
Conservatives courts tend toward strict construction and oppose judicial activism. It is 
often more complicated than that, however, with these various terms being politically 
loaded and sometimes employed in the rhetoric of opposing ideologies. But there is no 
doubt that, since statehood, judicial activism has been one element of the Alaska judicia-
ry’s decisions. 
The fallout from judicial activism, or sometimes when a court simply decides a case 
that comes before it in an impartial way, can affect the court system’s funding, or may pro-
duce a movement for judicial reform or opposition to the retention of certain judges. And 
even though the Alaska judiciary is organized to mitigate its being embroiled in politics, 
judicial politics is a constant and unavoidable fact of life in the past, present, and future 
of politics in Alaska. 
2. INFLUENCES THAT SHAPED AND CONTINUE TO AFFECT THE STRUCTURE     
    AND ROLES OF ALASKA’S THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 
Unlike most states, Alaska has a highly centralized and unified state court system. 
All courts are funded by the state, and ultimate administrative authority over all courts 
resides in the Alaska Supreme Court. There is no authority for municipalities to establish 
or administer local courts. Five interrelated influences were particularly important in 
shaping Alaska’s court system and its judicial branch, and some of them continue to influ-
ence this third branch of government. These are: (1) the pre- and post-statehood role of 
the federal government; (2) Alaska’s late admission to the Union; (3) the physical, social, 
and political geography of Alaska; (4) the influence of Alaska Natives; and (5) a strong 
commitment to individual rights. 
the pre- and post-Statehood role of the Federal Government 
The Organic Act of 1884 established the structure for Alaska’s territorial govern-
ment and court system. Judges and commissioners of the territorial court system were 
appointed to four-year terms by the U.S. president and subject to confirmation by the U.S. 
Senate. This system was fraught with structural and practical problems. Territorial judges 
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were subject to political pressure, such as threats of not being reappointed, and, therefore, 
were less able to counter powerful interest groups emerging in Alaska, such as mining 
syndicates and fishing interests. Moreover, the vastness and remoteness of the Territory 
imposed practical problems for judicial administration. The district court judges were 
spread across four judicial divisions (Juneau, Nome, Valdez/Anchorage, and Fairbanks), 
and their resources were largely expended on the most serious crimes. Outside these cit-
ies, there was little access to justice, and the system was constantly strained. By the early 
1950s, however, with the burgeoning Cold War, federal spending skyrocketed in Alaska. 
The increased population and accompanying social problems highlighted that the judicial 
system was completely inadequate to handle legal issues in the growing Territory.1 
Alaska’s Late Admission to the Union
Alaska’s late admission to the Union had far-reaching effects on its government and 
politics. This is particularly evident in the court system and its involvement in politics. In 
particular, the fact that Alaska’s founders could draw upon the experiences, both positive 
and negative, of the other forty-eight states influenced their approach to the organization 
of the court system. Plus, the dawning and consolidation of the age of atonement toward 
Native Americans has placed Alaska’s state courts in a particular relationship with tribal 
courts, and the issues regarding Alaska Natives and their political role resulting from 
Alaska’s late admission also affects the court system.
Another factor combines both Alaska’s late admission and its newness as a state. When 
statehood became a reality in 1959, the Alaska courts were faced with a blank slate when 
it came to many major legal issues. This vacuum of legal authority has allowed Alaska’s 
courts a unique perspective. The Alaska Supreme Court tends to side with the more mod-
ern or majority trends unless there is a strong legal or policy reason to do otherwise. 
The Physical, Social, and Political Geography of Alaska
Clearly, the physical geography of the state, its sheer size and barriers to transporta-
tion, present challenges to the Alaska court system not faced by small states like Vermont 
and Maryland or even large states that have developed road systems like Texas and 
Wyoming. These challenges include the cost of providing courts and the most efficient 
way to organize them in rural-bush areas. Then there are the influences resulting from the 
social geography of the state and particularly the cultural differences of the Alaska Native 
population, not only in rural-bush communities but also in urban areas. These factors 
can influence the court system because of the regional loyalties of politicians, particularly 
the efforts of rural-bush legislators and others to ensure an equal and culturally sensitive 
administration of justice in both urban and rural-bush areas. 
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the Influence of alaska Natives
Also identified as a characteristic of Alaska politics in Chapter 2 is the influence of 
Alaska Natives. One of the many facets of this influence has been on the court system. 
Over the years, this influence includes sensitivity on the part of the court system to pro-
viding justice in rural-bush areas and ensuring that the administration of justice is appro-
priate and sensitive to the effect of sentencing practices on Natives within the criminal 
justice system. The court system has also been aware of the political influence of rural-
bush legislators, many of whom are Alaska Natives, and the effect that they can have on 
court system budgets and other administrative initiatives. 
The influence of the Native community and its issues can be quite complex as they 
relate to the court system, particularly because of ongoing interactions between tribal 
courts and the state court system, and jurisdictional disputes between Alaska Native 
tribes and the state and federal governments on sovereignty issues. These complex inter-
actions often have major political as well as legal consequences. Two particularly thorny 
issues in this regard have been subsistence and Native sovereignty (for details on these 
issues, see Chapter 9 on Alaska Natives).
a Strong Commitment to Individual rights 
The protection of individual rights by the Alaska Supreme Court (which has some-
times involved judicial activism) has been a major source of the political controversy sur-
rounding the judiciary. The court is most likely to be at the center of particularly intense 
political debate resulting from the protection of the individual rights of unpopular groups 
and politically divisive issues. This can put the court at odds with conservative lawmakers, 
forcing the state Supreme Court to find creative ways to protect rights while still deferring 
to reasonable policy goals of the legislature.
Several states have a commitment to the protection of individual rights in their con-
stitutions, including Alaska. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has championed indi-
vidual rights, such as privacy and religion, as stringently, if not more so, than any state in 
the nation. For example, nine other states have “privacy” provisions in their constitutions, 
but only Alaska has a judicial opinion like Ravin v. State (1975), holding that personal 
privacy in the home outweighs the state’s interest in prohibiting possession in one’s home 
of small amounts of marijuana intended for personal use.
3. THE ORGANIZATION OF ALASKA’S COURT SYSTEM  
    COMPARED WITH OTHER STATES 
State court systems across the United States include a wide variety of structures. 
Some, like Alaska, have highly unified systems, with the state Supreme Court having 
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administrative supervision of all other appellate courts and all trial courts. Even within 
a fairly unified system, there may be several specialized trial courts dealing with specific 
areas of law, such as criminal or family law. And most systems, regardless of the degree of 
unification, have at least two levels of trial courts with differing levels of jurisdiction. For 
instance, virtually all states have “superior courts” (sometimes called “courts of general 
jurisdiction”), which are allowed to hear any kind of case, including civil cases involving 
any amount of money and criminal cases involving both serious (felony) and less seri-
ous (misdemeanor) crimes. Most states also have lower courts with, for example, criminal 
jurisdiction limited to traffic violations and misdemeanors and civil jurisdiction limited to 
cases involving small amounts of money. Figure 17.1, comparing the structure of Alaska’s 
court system with those of New York and Wyoming, highlights these contrasts.
The Alaska Supreme Court has total administrative authority over all levels of courts 
in the state. There are no city courts to contend with or family courts or traffic courts to 
complicate the administration of justice. Compare this to the organization of the New 
York system, an example of a more complex, fragmented court structure with many 
courts dealing with specific and narrow areas of law (as illustrated in Figure 17.1). Alaska 
and some other western states reflect the modern trend of a unified court system. Some 
sparsely populated western states have more streamlined court systems because they do 
not have the population or volume of litigation necessary to justify special courts to han-
dle only probate, traffic, or family matters. New Jersey is an example of an eastern high- 
population state with a unified system not unlike Alaska’s. It was, in fact, New Jersey’s 
court system that Alaska’s founders found very appealing in developing the Alaska court 
system. Wyoming is another example of a unified court system, as Figure 17.1 shows.  
Several western states have added levels of courts as needed while maintaining the 
overall unified organization of their state court systems (see, for example, information on 
the Alaska Court of Appeals, below). The reliance on fewer courts of specialized jurisdic-
tion in many western states, including Alaska, means that judges must hear all manner of 
cases, so the judiciary tends to be composed of highly competent generalists rather than 
specialists in any one area of law. The structure of its court system is another way in which 
Alaska is like many of its western neighbors.2 
Box 17.1 explains the types of courts, their jurisdiction, and judicial officials in Alaska. 
There are some features not present in most states. First, the superior court can act as both 
a general trial court as well as an appellate court for the district court. Another variation 
is Alaska’s Court of Appeals, established in 1980, which handles only criminal appeals. 
This court was created as a matter of judicial economy (that is, the allocation of judicial 
resources and expertise) and to provide the due process right to an appeal without over-
loading the Alaska Supreme Court. Parties can still appeal an Alaska Court of Appeals 
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 BOX 17.1 
alaska’s Courts, Judicial Officials,  
and What they Do
GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE  
COURT SYSTEM
As in Territorial days, Alaska continues to divide 
the state into four judicial districts. The first judi-
cial district covers Southeast Alaska. The second 
includes Northwest Alaska and the North Slope. 
The third covers Southcentral Alaska, the state’s 
major population center, as well as the Bristol 
Bay region and the Aleutian Chain. And the fourth 
includes the Interior and Southwest Alaska, includ-
ing Bethel. 
TYPES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICIALS
Magistrates 
Magistrates are judicial officers of the district 
court who hear certain district court matters and 
often work in rural-bush areas where there is no 
full-time district court judge. They also help with 
the caseloads in urban areas. Magistrates are 
appointed by the presiding judges of the four judi-
cial districts. They are not required to be lawyers, 
nor are they required to stand for retention elec-
tions as are all judges. A magistrate’s jurisdiction 
includes small claims cases, solemnizing mar-
riages, domestic violence cases, traffic infractions, 
arrest warrants, and summonses. 
District Courts 
The Alaska Constitution provides that the leg-
islature shall establish such lower courts as may 
be necessary. Accordingly, in 1959, the legislature 
created a district court for each judicial district. 
In 2016 the district court had twenty-three judges 
statewide. District court judges may, for example, 
hear misdemeanors, first appearances in felony 
cases, and civil cases valued up to $100,000.
Superior Court 
The superior court is the trial court of general 
jurisdiction. Each of Alaska’s four judicial districts 
has a superior court. In 2016 there were forty-three 
such judgeships located throughout the state. The 
superior court has authority to hear all cases, both 
civil and criminal, properly brought before the state 
courts, although it does not routinely hear cases that 
may be brought in the district court. The superior 
court also hears appeals from the district court and 
from executive agency administrative adjudications. 
Court of Appeals
The court of appeals consists of a chief judge 
and two associate judges. It has the authority to 
hear appeals in criminal cases and certain other 
quasi-criminal cases in which a minor is accused 
of committing a crime (juvenile delinquency cases), 
cases in which prisoners are challenging the legal-
ity of their confinement (habeas corpus matters), 
and cases involving probation and parole decisions. 
Supreme Court 
The Alaska Supreme Court is the highest state 
court. It hears appeals from lower state courts and 
also administers the state’s judicial system. The 
court is comprised of the chief justice and four asso-
ciate justices. All five, by majority vote, select one 
of their members as chief justice, who holds office 
for three years. The chief justice may not serve con-
secutive terms, but can be reelected after sitting 
out one term. The Court has final state appellate 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in Alaska. 
However, certain issues can be appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court—primarily those involving ques-
tions of federal statutory or constitutional law.
Source: Developed by the author.  
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decision to the Alaska Supreme Court, but the Alaska Supreme Court has discretionary 
authority to hear the case, meaning it can hear the case or decline to do so.
From both an administrative and political point of view, Alaska’s unified and central-
ized court system appears very appropriate for the state’s socio-economic and geograph-
ical circumstances and has many advantages over a fragmented system. The unified sys-
tem allows the Alaska Supreme Court, through its administrative director, to organize the 
system to compensate for the vastness and high costs of administering justice and deal 
with other—often uniquely Alaskan—judicial issues. This may actually reduce the polit-
ical involvement in judicial actions as the system anticipates and addresses needs that it 
can enforce throughout the system. If this were a fragmented system like those found in 
New York or Arkansas, no such centralized body would exist to develop and administer 
such statewide legal policy. Moreover, politics are more pervasive in such fragmented 
systems as various legal jurisdictions vie with one another for state funds.3
Alaska Native Tribal Courts and Councils
Alaska’s state court system interacts with Alaska Native tribal courts and village coun-
cils across the state. Although the U.S. Supreme Court largely squelched Alaska Native 
sovereignty in the Venetie case in 1998, the fact remains that both formal and informal 
dispute resolution continues to take place outside the Alaska court system.4 These tribal 
courts and councils span both rural-bush and urban areas and cover an array of local 
issues. Some past and present examples of tribal courts in Alaska include the Sitka Tribal 
Court, Tanana Chiefs Council, Tlingit and Haida Court, Chevak Tribal Court, Minto 
Tribal Court, and others throughout the state.5  
A primary area of jurisdiction for tribal courts involves the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA) cases and customary adoptions. Congress passed the ICWA in 1978, prompted 
by the high number of American Indian and Alaska Native children being removed from 
their homes by both public and private agencies.6 Tribal courts or village councils may 
also handle disputes about public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and minor juvenile 
offenses. They also help parties settle small property claims. These courts may impose 
fines, require community work service and alcohol treatment, or stipulate other condi-
tions. Some tribal courts and village councils are somewhat structured, while others are 
more informal.
Resolution by tribal courts of minor regulatory offenses benefits both the state (by 
easing its caseload) and the locality (by providing enforcement). More serious crimes and 
larger civil claims are still heard in the state court system. Tribal courts rely heavily on 
cooperation not only with the state’s judicial branch but also with executive branch agen-
cies. The success of tribal courts in Alaska largely depends on whether the relationship 
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Bush Justice:  
an Imprecise term with Several Meanings
The term bush justice is often used in Alaska 
to refer to judicial and law enforcement activities 
in rural-bush areas, but mainly in remote Alaska 
Native villages. However, the term is imprecise 
and can mean different things to different people. 
Broadly, it has three different meanings, and often 
there is overlap among them.
THE STATE COURT SYSTEM’S PERSPECTIVE
The court system tends to view bush justice in 
terms of the challenges of providing access to state 
courts in a timely and effective manner across the 
vast geographical area of rural-bush Alaska. It also 
involves raising the awareness of judges, magis-
trates, and other court system personnel to the 
cultural perspective of Alaska Natives. These chal-
lenges have partly been addressed through the ini-
tiatives referred to in the text as judicial administra-
tive activism.
 THE PUBLIC SAFETY PERSPECTIVE 
Isolated rural-bush areas accessible only by air 
or water often wait days before the nearest state 
trooper can respond to infractions of the law, espe-
cially in winter. Thus, village public safety officers 
(VPSOs) or village councils often fill gaps in law 
enforcement and dispute resolution. Plus, individu-
als or groups sometimes resort to self-help, infor-
mal community dispute resolution, or other means 
of enforcement of community norms and values. 
THE TRIBAL COURT AND VILLAGE COUNCIL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Some view bush justice as referring to the role 
of tribal courts and village councils in dispute res-
olution. Particular areas of their jurisdiction are 
sanctioned by federal law, as explained in the text 
regarding the role of tribal courts and councils. To 
some extent, this perspective is intertwined with the 
issue of Native sovereignty and the right claimed by 
many Native groups to pass judgment and enforce 
those judgments based on the legal sovereignty of 
Alaska tribes.      
Source: Developed by the author. 
between state and tribal courts is cooperative or competitive. One issue regarding the 
state-tribal court relationship is that of comity: state courts are not legally bound to follow 
tribal court decisions but can do so if they wish. 
A term often used in the activities of the court system and law enforcement in rural 
and particularly bush areas is bush justice. But, as Box 17.2 points out, this is a very 
imprecise term.
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4. PROVISIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY:  
    JUDICIAL SELECTION AND RETENTION IN ALASKA AND IN OTHER STATES
In the selection and retention of judges, there is a major distinction between state 
and federal courts. The U.S. Constitution provides lifetime tenure for U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, U.S. Court of Appeals judges, and District Court judges “during good behavior,” 
with no retention elections, though their initial appointments must be confirmed by the 
U.S. Senate. In contrast, the vast majority of state court judges—some 87 percent—are 
subject to popular election in some form.7 
Across the fifty states, the methods of judicial selection and retention run the gamut 
from never facing voters to contested, partisan elections. These differences are partly an 
outgrowth of the political culture and the history of each state. Southern states, with their 
Jacksonian tradition of direct voter accountability, tend to favor a judiciary fully account-
able to voters through contested elections. Northeastern states, with judicial systems 
developed at the time of the birth of the nation, favor appointment and even life tenure, 
in order to insulate judges from the political atmosphere of a contested election. With 
their populist and progressive traditions, a number of Midwestern and western states, 
including Alaska, balance elections and appointments by using a method known as the 
Missouri Plan, or merit selection system.  
The Missouri Plan has two key features. First, the governor appoints a candidate from 
a list drawn up by a nonpartisan council called a judicial council or judicial commis-
sion, among other designations. Use of a judicial commission to assist in gubernatorial 
appointment is part of a modern trend in use in 34 states and the District of Columbia.8 
Second, there are periodic uncontested retention elections after initial appointment, in 
which voters are asked to vote “yes” or “no” to the question, “Should Judge X be retained?”9 
The Missouri Plan involves a minimal and sometimes no role for the legislature. The plan 
considerably reduces the intense partisanship, acrimony and high cost that often accom-
panies contested judicial elections in many states.10 
alaska’s Judicial Selection process
As in most western states, the process of judicial selection and retention in Alaska 
is a prime example of balancing accountability with the need for judicial independence. 
History and political culture came very much into play when Alaska’s founders developed 
these aspects of Article IV of the constitution. The Territorial history of strong exter-
nal economic and political forces and an inadequate judicial system favored creation of 
an independent judiciary insulated as much as possible from politics. At the same time, 
there is a strong strain of democracy and populism in Alaska that wants to make officials 
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accountable to voters. Together, these forces help explain the founders’ selection of the 
balanced Missouri Plan.
Alaska’s selection of its supreme court justices and other judges is similar to seven-
teen states in that their appointments are recommended by an independent judicial com-
mission—the Alaska Judicial Council. The governor then appoints the justice or judge 
from the list forwarded to him or her by the council. The appointee must then stand for 
retention at the next regular general election. Alaska allows a very limited role for the leg-
islature in determining the composition of its court system. This role includes legislative 
confirmation of the three members of the Judicial Council who are appointed by the gov-
ernor, controlling the number of judges in each judicial district, and using the budgetary 
process to create judicial positions to meet policy goals. However, as explained later, in 
2014 there was a move to change the composition of the Judicial Council and the role of 
the legislature in the confirmation process of members of the council. 
Judicial retention elections in alaska 
States vary widely in the length of their judicial terms—the years between retention 
elections. The length of terms in a state is one indication of the state’s propensity towards 
either independence or accountability. Seventeen states, including Alaska, have uncon-
tested retention elections following initial appointment. Of these, seven western states, 
including Alaska, have uncontested retention elections for general jurisdiction courts.11
Alaska bases the frequency of retention elections on the level of court. Supreme 
Court Justices stand for retention every ten years. Eleven other states have ten-year terms 
for their highest court, a length surpassed only by six states.12 Alaska Court of Appeals 
judges stand every eight years, Superior Court judges every six years, and District Court 
judges appear on the ballot every four years. Alaska’s reluctance to allow contested judi-
cial elections, in theory, shifts the focus from the competing ideologies of candidates to 
the individual performance of the incumbent. Across the United States, the vast majority 
of judges who stand for uncontested retention elections are retained. In Alaska, 60 to 70 
percent of voters generally choose to retain judges. Only a few have not been retained, 
usually due to misconduct or performance issues. 
Balancing populism and Judicial Independence: a Look Inside the alaska Judicial Council and 
Challenges to Its Nonpartisan Makeup
The key mechanism by which the courts have achieved a balance between populism 
and independence is through the evaluation and selection criteria employed by the non-
partisan Alaska Judicial Council. The framers saw this body as so crucial to the vitality of 
the courts that they enshrined it in the state constitution.
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Composition of the Judicial Council
The Alaska Constitution Article IV, Section 8, provides that the Judicial Council shall 
have seven members. Three are lawyers appointed by the Alaska Bar Association and 
three are non-lawyers appointed by the governor and confirmed by the legislature. The 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is the council’s seventh ex officio member and chair-
person. The six appointed members sit for staggered six-year terms, are spread geograph-
ically throughout the state, and are appointed without regard to political affiliation. 
Arguably, the legal profession has the most influence in this nomination process with 
three lawyers and the Chief Justice, who by law is required to have been a practicing lawyer 
prior to appointment to the court. However, this influence may not be entirely a bad thing. 
One of the fundamental concepts underlying the Missouri Plan is that judges should be 
selected on the basis of merit—that is, the ability to be a good judge—rather than political 
influence. Law-trained members have more familiarity than laypersons with the subject 
matter and the candidates. At the same time, it is important to have the balanced views 
that the three lay members bring to the selection process. Maintaining balance on the 
council is critical because of its gate-keeping function: the governor may only choose 
judges from the list forwarded to him or her by the council. While in theory this system 
should avoid politics entering into the judicial selection process, in practice it has not been 
without controversy, and there is the potential for partisan politics to become involved.
Avoiding Deadlock: The Council Averts a Potentially Stymied Process
Some past governors have asked the council to provide additional names from which 
to make a judicial appointment. In August of 2004, however, Governor Murkowski for-
mally rejected the list provided to him by the council. The rejection sparked numerous 
editorials across the state, mostly in favor of an independent judiciary. Further conflict 
was averted a month later when the governor made an appointment from the original list. 
The event is noteworthy as it represents potential for a stymied process. The governor and 
the Judicial Council could conceivably deadlock in a protracted clash, with the governor 
refusing to appoint from the list provided, and the Judicial Council refusing to name 
additional candidates. It is unlikely that the council will ever provide the governor with 
additional candidates in such a situation.13 Continued deadlock would probably lead to 
litigation, and the litigation would be decided in the judicial branch, which would follow 
the constitution and thus find in favor of the council. Thus there is little incentive for the 
governor to pursue or sustain this kind of deadlock.
Ensuring Independence and Quality: The Council’s Evaluation of Judicial Candidates
The Alaska Judicial Council also makes recommendations regarding the fitness of 
judges facing retention elections. It scores judges numerically on a range of criteria, and, 
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in rare cases, will recommend to the electorate that a judge not be retained. Some of the 
criteria the council uses to evaluate existing judges include surveys by attorneys, peace 
officers, social workers, jurors and court employees; attorney questionnaires; and other 
records. 
A summary of the council’s evaluations and recommendations are included in the 
Official Election Pamphlet published by the Division of Elections in the lieutenant gov-
ernor’s office. The pamphlet contains important information about a judicial candidate’s 
fitness for office. This is particularly valuable because there is a paucity of information 
available to voters regarding judicial retention elections. This evaluation and recommen-
dation role is another way in which the council plays a prominent role in the merit system 
in Alaska. 
Moves to Reform the Composition of the Judicial Council
Not all Alaskans, however, are happy with the work of the council and particularly 
the types of candidates it nominates for appointment. Many Alaska conservatives and 
strongly religious people believe the records of those nominees recommended to the gov-
ernor and appointed to the bench are too activist and are unhappy with court decisions 
on abortion and other social issues. They see attorneys as having too much say in the 
selection of judges. These opponents of the present process have the support of several 
conservative Republicans in the legislature, including Senator Pete Kelly of Fairbanks. In 
the 2014 legislative session, Kelly introduced Senate Joint Resolution 21 (SJR 21). The final 
version of SJR 21 would have increased the number of Judicial Council members to ten 
by adding three more lay members and also require the legislature to confirm the lawyer 
appointees, which, as indicated earlier, is not presently the case. The change would require 
a constitutional amendment first approved by two-thirds of each house of the legislature 
(fourteen votes in the Senate and twenty-seven in the House) and then approved by the 
voters. 
Jim Miller of Alaska Family Action (a conservative family values organization) said 
in a blog post supporting the amendment that it, “would fundamentally transform the 
council from a panel dominated by legal elites into a panel dominated by non-attorney 
citizens.” Opponents of the measure, primarily moderate Republicans and Democrats, 
argue that it would politicize the appointment of judges.14 Before their election as gover-
nor and lieutenant governor, respectively, in November 2014, both Bill Walker (an attor-
ney by profession) and Byron Mallott, a prominent Alaska Native leader, strongly opposed 
the amendment. Mallott commented that the amendment would “reshape the judiciary 
into an ideological rubber stamp of government actions. This is because the governor 
would choose the six lay members, and the legislature would confirm or reject the attor-
ney members, and political partisanship would inevitably come into play.”15 Although 
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the governor has no role in the constitutional amendment process, Governor Walker’s 
position may help the opponents and supplement the position of the bulk of the state’s 
legal profession who also oppose the amendment. A group of attorneys and concerned 
citizens, including former Supreme Court Chief Justice Walter “Bud” Carpeneti, have 
formed Justice Not Politics Alaska, a nonprofit lobby group to fight the amendment.16
Even though SJR 21 never came to the Senate floor for a vote in the 2014 session, the 
issue has probably not gone away. The years to come may see further conflict over this issue. 
the alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct
In all fifty states and at the federal level, judges must follow strict rules of ethical 
conduct. As the vetting process is so stringent in states like Alaska, judicial misconduct 
is not widespread. However, every state has an organization to investigate allegations of 
judicial misconduct. In Alaska this body is the Commission on Judicial Conduct, a body 
established in Article IV, Section 10, of the Alaska Constitution. 
Composed of three judges, three lawyers, and three public members, the commis-
sion investigates complaints alleging misconduct by a particular judge. Most complaints 
are filed by litigants, though some are filed by lawyers who have observed conduct that 
allegedly violates the ethical rules of conduct for judges. The most typical complaints 
against judges allege improper courtroom behavior and bias, though any judicial behav-
ior that constitutes a violation of ethical rules may form the basis of a complaint. The 
commission investigates all complaints that are within its jurisdiction. Its proceedings are 
kept confidential, although it periodically issues nonconfidential advisory opinions about 
what a judge may or may not do in a hypothetical situation.  
Some complaints, such as those in which a litigant simply disagrees with a legal rul-
ing by the judge, are dismissed immediately without investigation, as the commission 
does not consider complaints of that nature as being within its jurisdiction. If the com-
mission finds probable cause to believe that a violation of the ethical rules has taken place, 
it may proceed to a formal hearing. If, after the hearing, the commission finds that a judge 
has violated the ethical rules, it does not itself impose discipline on the judge. Instead, it 
makes a recommendation to the Alaska Supreme Court for particular disciplinary action. 
The Supreme Court has ultimate authority to take disciplinary action, ranging from pri-
vate or public censure, to suspension, and even to removal from office. 
5. THE JUDICIARY AND ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
In this section we go into more detail on six aspects of the Alaska court system’s polit-
ical role: (1) the issue of judicial activism; (2) a corollary issue of privacy and individual 
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rights; (3) rural-bush versus urban court facilities and Alaska Native issues; (4) the court 
system as a lobby; (5) the court system as a target of “lobbying”; and (6) the politics of 
court reform. In many ways, these six are interrelated. The interrelationship stems from 
the court system’s effect on Alaska politics and public policy and reactions to that influ-
ence by the other two branches, by the public, and sometimes by the media.
Opposing Viewpoints: Judicial Independence or Judicial activism?
The Alaska Supreme Court has engaged in judicial activism in varying degrees since 
statehood. There are very different perceptions about the validity of this role of the judi-
cial branch among Alaskans. 
This was especially apparent when the Alaska legislature and the courts clashed in the 
late 1990s in cases such as Bess v. Ulmer (1999).17 The case dealt with three highly charged 
ballot initiatives proposing changes to the Alaska Constitution (restricting marriage to 
the union of a man and woman, limiting prisoners’ constitutional rights, and legislative 
reapportionment). The Alaska Supreme Court struck down the prisoners’ rights initiative 
and struck a sentence out of the wording of another initiative. Altering the ballot initia-
tive was seen by some as an affront to the democratic process and set the stage for a battle 
between the will of the people as reflected in the ballot initiatives and the force of law as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Conservative legislators like Senators Dave Donley, Robin Taylor, and Loren Leman 
countered with proposed constitutional amendments calling for more frequent retention 
elections and even judicial appointment directly by the governor without nominations by 
the Judicial Council.18 These proposals failed. But, as with the issue of the composition of 
the Judicial Council considered earlier, competing ideologies about the proper role of the 
courts in relation to public policy have been a constant in Alaska politics since soon after 
statehood, and it is likely to continue. 
Individual rights
The expansion of individual rights by the Alaska Supreme Court has also resulted in 
a clash of ideologies over the proper role of the courts. Chapter 4, on the constitution and 
its interpretation, pays considerable attention to the hallmark role of the courts, and par-
ticularly the Alaska Supreme Court, in defining Alaskans’ personal rights, and explains 
key court decisions.  
Other examples of the court’s decisions on personal rights include Mickens v. City of 
Kodiak (1982), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held that nude dancing in a bar is a 
form of free expression protected by freedom of speech, and Frank v. State (1979), linking 
the taking of moose out of season for a funeral potlatch to religious freedom.19 Then, in 
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the ruling in Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State of Alaska (2005), the Court ruled that 
the constitution requires the state to provide the same benefits to public employees in a 
same-sex relationship that it provides to public employees in traditional marriages.20 
rural-Bush versus Urban Court Facilities and alaska Native Issues 
The significance of Alaska Native issues remains high among the concerns of the 
court system, even after the Venetie decision. This is for both administrative and political 
reasons. 
Administratively, the Alaska court system has always been cognizant of providing 
judicial services in rural-bush Alaska that both enhance access and are culturally sensi-
tive. The court system has noted disparities in the access to courts among rural-bush and 
urban residents. A 1997 report from a Supreme Court advisory committee stated:
Urban residents have far more access to justice system services than 
village residents. One-fourth of Alaskans do not live within reasonable 
reach of many court system services. Rural residents do not receive ade-
quate legal representation in either civil or criminal matters.21
The report also catalogued many language and culture problems and provided rec-
ommendations to help bridge the urban versus rural-bush divide, as well as the estimated 
costs to do so. Part of the divide is historical, as the state uses four judicial districts that 
are a vestige of the Territorial era, so the system is naturally biased toward the population 
centers of the state. The court system has worked to address these problems through judi-
cial administrative activism. Among other provisions, the court system has ensured that 
most areas with a significant population have at least some access to a magistrate, that 
there is cultural sensitivity training for judges and court employees, and, where appropri-
ate, that tribal and village council dispute resolution mechanisms are utilized.
Over the years, these and other provisions by the court system have made many polit-
ical points with rural-bush and particularly Native legislators. This has been of crucial 
importance because many Native legislators, such as John Sackett, Frank Fergusson, Al 
Adams, Lyman Hoffman, and Albert Kookesh, have been in key positions of power and 
able to influence the court system’s budget as well as other issues affecting the courts. The 
importance of such political points will become clearer in considering the role of the 
judiciary as a lobby.   
alaska’s Court System as a Lobby: promoting and protecting Its Interests 
Although judges are largely insulated from day-to-day politics, the Alaska court 
system is a large bureaucracy and has the same needs as any bureaucracy. It needs new 
buildings, technology, support staff, funds to implement new programs, salary increases, 
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retirement benefits, and so on. Consequently, even though it is a separate branch of gov-
ernment, the court system, like state agencies, needs to advocate for itself in the budget-
ary process and weigh in on policy proposals that impact the administration of justice. 
Responsibility for these duties rests largely with the administrative director of the court 
system. Box 17.3 explains the director’s role. 
Until the mid-1970s, Alaska’s courts relied on the executive branch to deal with many 
administrative matters (personnel, facilities, and so on). Therefore, while constitutionally 
 BOX 17.3 
the administrative Director of the alaska  
Court System: a Link to the executive and  
Legislative Branches
Section 16 of Article VI of the Alaska Constitu-
tion states in part:
The chief justice of the court system 
shall be the administrative head of the 
courts. . . . The chief justice shall, with the 
approval of the supreme court, appoint an 
administrative director to serve at the plea-
sure of the supreme court and to supervise 
the administrative operations of the judicial 
system.    
The administrative director, then, is a constitu-
tionally mandated official of the judiciary. That per-
son is primarily responsible for the efficient day-to-
day administration of the court system and works 
closely with judges, especially the Supreme Court 
and particularly the Chief Justice, to develop the 
goals and priorities of the judiciary. 
While individual administrative directors may 
vary in their approaches, one of their essential 
roles in implementing court system goals and pri-
orities is a political role—to act as a link to the leg-
islative and executive branches of government. This 
involves lobbying and developing relationships and 
reaching agreements with legislators and executive 
department officials. Part of this role may involve 
the director acting as a buffer to shield the judi-
ciary from conflicts of interest or the appearance 
of impropriety. 
Since the court system established its bud-
getary and administrative independence from the 
executive branch in the mid-1970s, the administra-
tive director, either directly or through a member 
of the administrative office staff, has been of cru-
cial importance in dealing with public policies that 
impact the court system. The legislature, in particu-
lar, is where the court system must focus its efforts 
related to budgetary goals and statutory changes. 
Different administrative directors may choose 
to be less politically active personally and may del-
egate direct contact with the legislature to other 
administrative office staff. But even though the 
political styles of administrative directors may dif-
fer over time, the court system’s role as a lobby is 
a continual one.
Source: Developed by the author and largely based on a phone interview of February 10, 2010, with Arthur 
Snowden, former administrative director of the Alaska Court System, 1973–1997. 
624
ALASKA POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
an independent branch of government, the court system’s administrative functions were 
not independent. One major example was the governor’s insistence on having a say in the 
court system’s annual budget request before it went to the legislature. This changed with the 
hiring of a new administrative director, Arthur Snowden, in 1973. Snowden, who served 
until 1997, worked with the Supreme Court to establish the judiciary as a truly indepen-
dent branch of government and created an efficient court system administratively. The 
system also established itself as a credible and effective political force in its relations with 
the other two branches of government. As a result, the court system secured many benefits 
for its employees, including a new courthouse for Anchorage, funds for the administration 
of rural-bush facilities and services, and increased pay and benefits for judges. 
The Court System as a Target of Lobbying
There is another aspect of lobbying that often places the court system, particularly 
the Supreme Court, in the thick of state politics. This is when the courts are the target of 
lobbying—not in the sense that the courts are being lobbied as courts, but rather the use 
of the courts by interest groups and other bodies, including the state, to obtain rulings in 
their favor on an issue directly affecting public policy and in some cases actually making 
policy. The use of the courts by various interests is on the increase and is often used when 
the legislature or executive branch will not act on an issue or has not produced a result 
satisfactory to the interest concerned. Some of these cases involve judicial activism, with 
the court making a broad policy ruling beyond what the facts of the case might require. 
In other cases, the courts are passive, and go no further than to resolve disputed facts and 
legal arguments.
Whether passive or activist, the decisions of courts can have far-reaching policy 
effects and sometime controversial ones. Three of the most prominent Alaska decisions 
with significant policy implications include the Molly Hootch decision in the mid-1970s—
with the Molly Hootch Consent Decree of 1976—resulting in the establishment of high 
schools in rural-bush communities.22 The mental health trust land issue in the 1980s 
and 1990s was resolved in part by the Alaska Supreme Court’s ruling that the state had 
failed to live up to its trust obligations to set aside state lands to fund mental health pro-
grams.23 And the Cleary case, concluded in 2001, dealt with prisoners’ rights regarding 
overcrowded prisons.24 
Political Issues Regarding Reform of the Judiciary 
Even though there are calls from time to time for reforming the judiciary, especially 
those precipitated by the ideological debate between the activist and strict construction 
perspectives, none so far has succeeded. The ultimate outcome of calls by Senator Pete 
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Kelly and others to revamp the Judicial Council is uncertain, as there will likely be future 
efforts to reform the council. However, there are several factors that make major reform 
of the Alaska judiciary in the foreseeable future less likely. 
First, in many ways, judicial reform in Alaska took place at the Constitutional 
Convention in Fairbanks in 1955–1956. The founders’ efforts to promote judicial inde-
pendence, impartiality, and public accountability, to minimize judicial involvement in 
politics, and to ensure efficiency through a unified court system administration, seem 
to have sat well with the Alaska public and most policy makers. Consequently, there has 
been no surge of support for judicial reform. In fact, the situation is quite the reverse, as 
evidenced by the public outcry, described above, at Governor Murkowski’s attempts to 
inject politics into the judicial selection process in 2004. This included close to two hun-
dred editorials appearing throughout the state defending an independent judiciary. 
Furthermore, while the legislature and executive have been touched by several cases 
of corruption, including prison sentences for public officials, the Alaska judiciary has 
never been affected in this way. Nationwide, the state’s judiciary has a reputation for effi-
ciency and integrity. As a candidate, Governor Walker commented that, “Alaska enjoys 
the reputation as having the finest state judiciary in the nation.”25   
6. CONCLUSION: INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY,  
    AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE
The theme of this chapter was posed in the form of a question: How does the Alaska 
political and governmental process deal with the tension between the need for indepen-
dence, a degree of public accountability, and the court system’s role in politics and public 
policy making? 
In an imperfect world, there is certainly no ideal solution to this tension. Yet, Alaska’s 
court system meets this challenge as well as any state judiciary in the United States. Alaska 
does so by combining centralized judicial administration with merit selection and uncon-
tested retention confirmation of judges, thereby insulating the judiciary from politics as 
far as possible. And given the inevitability of the court system’s involvement in politics, 
both through court decisions and the bureaucratic needs of the system regarding its bud-
get, among other issues, it appears that this political role has been kept within acceptable 
bounds. Those opposed to judicial activism would, of course, argue otherwise. However, 
given the fact that, as of 2016, there have been no successful movements to reform the 
judiciary since statehood, the balance between independence, accountability, and politics 
appears to have been advantageous to the development of Alaska as a democratic polity.  
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